



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
II MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
POSTAL SERVICE CENTER BOX 80150
CHERRY POINT, NC 28533-0050

WgO 3302.1A
G-3
AUG 10 2011

WING ORDER 3302.1A

From: Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing
To: Distribution List

Subj: 2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING (2D MAW) ANTITERRORISM FORCE
PROTECTION (ATFP) PROGRAM

Ref: (a) MCO 3302.1E
(b) DoDInst 2000.16
(c) DoDO 2000.12H
(d) DoDInst 2000.14
(e) DoDDir 2000.12
(f) DoDInst 2000.18
(g) Joint Pub 3-07.2
(h) AirStaO 3302.1A
(i) AirStaO 1610.6B W/Ch 1
(j) AirStaO 5530.2B
(k) SECNAVINST 5511.36A
(l) WgO 3070.1C
(m) CJCSM 3150.03

Encl: (1) Annex A-H

1. Situation

a. Reference (a) directs the Marine Corps to implement certain measures in support of ATFP. This Order provides policy, responsibilities and procedures for 2d MAW in order to fulfill these requirements. References (b) through (m) are excellent sources of information for planning and executing ATFP programs.

b. The 2d MAW Command Element is a tenant command of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, NC. As such, the command

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only; (contains operational information for official 2d MAW use only) (effective date signed). Other requests for this document will be referred to 2d MAW.

AUG 10 2011

element and all 2d MAW subordinate units located on MCAS Cherry Point fall under the operational control of the station ATFP Officer in the case of terrorist attack or Weapons of Mass Destruction/Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear or High Yield Explosive (WMD/ CBRNE) incident on the Air Station. 2d MAW subordinate commands not located on MCAS Cherry Point will fall under the operational control of their respective ATFP Officer in the case of a terrorist attack or WMD/ CBRNE incident on that facility.

2. Cancellation. WgO 3302.1.

3. Mission. Upon issuance of this Order, 2d MAW will conduct continuous ATFP operations in order to protect Marines, Sailors, civilian employees, their families, 2d MAW resources and 2d MAW critical infrastructure from the effects of terrorist threats and/or attacks with minimal disruption to 2d MAW military operations.

4. Execution

a. Commander's Intent and Concept of Operations

(1) Commander's Intent. 2d MAW must be prepared to implement Force Protection Condition (FPCON) Anti-Terrorism (AT) measures in the form of pre-planned, pre-incident action sets. 2d MAW must also be prepared to respond if a CBRNE incident takes place. All 2d MAW personnel are responsible for developing a high state of readiness and responding to support this plan. The way ahead is to implement an aggressive ATFP program, which will employ proactive measures to deter terrorist attacks and or reduce our vulnerability to the potentially harmful effects of natural disasters or man-made incidents before they occur. The guiding principles of this plan include detailed planning, improved individual/unit awareness, education and training, a strong intelligence base, aggressive actions to minimize vulnerabilities and threat evaluation and vulnerability assessment. This plan establishes the baseline posture to be maintained while conducting normal operations and serves as the foundation for developing and executing increased appropriate reactive measures when required. This plan will focus 2d MAW efforts toward the employment of antiterrorism measures, mitigation of effects and incident recovery/reconstitution. Synchronization of subordinate command capabilities, careful employment of scarce resources and memorandum of agreements with local, county, state and federal agencies will produce the synergy essential in dealing with the threat. The goal is that

AUG 10 2011

the safety and security of 2d MAW personnel and their families is preserved and the harmful effects of terrorist incidents to 2d MAW resources is prevented and/or mitigated, while having minimal impact on the normal activities.

(2) Concept of Operations. This plan stresses deterrence of terrorist incidents through preventative and response measures common to all subordinate commands. During day-to-day operations the command must stress continuous antiterrorism planning and passive, defensive operations. Planning and execution requires that staff elements work with a much greater degree of cohesiveness and unity of mission than that required during the conduct of normal base operations. ATFP has five essential program elements: Risk Management, Planning Training and Exercises, Resource Application and Comprehensive Program Review in accordance with reference (b). Detailed plans will be developed according to three distinct phases: pre-incident, incident and post-incident. The pre-incident phase establishes baseline, normal activities. The incident phase consists of those measures employed to address the situation as it occurs. The post-incident phase focuses on those actions taken to return to normal operations.

b. Subordinate Element Missions

(1) Assistant Chief of Staff (AC/S), G-3, 2d MAW:

(a) Per the references, develop and implement a comprehensive Anti-Terrorism (AT) program to comply with all the standards contained in reference (b).

(b) Designate a full-time staff officer in writing to supervise, inspect, exercise, review, assess and report on the AT programs within the command. Commanders shall maintain a full-time Anti-Terrorism Officer (ATO) and consider a full-time AT staff.

(c) Ensure a terrorism threat assessment is prepared at least annually and identifies the full range of known or estimated terrorist capabilities for use in conducting vulnerability assessment and planning countermeasures.

(d) Ensure a higher headquarters vulnerability assessment is performed at least once every three years.

(e) Ensure measures are developed to provide appropriate protective services for high-risk personnel and such individuals in high-risk billets.

(2) 2d MAW ATO:

(a) Must be appointed in writing and will be trained in AT procedures in a formal service-approved Level II course.

(b) Develop, maintain and review the command AT plan and ensure subordinate commands are in compliance.

(c) Conduct AT training and ensure subordinate command ATOs are trained at a formal service-approved Level II course.

(d) Ensure Level I training is conducted throughout 2d MAW. Active duty service members will receive Level I training annually and/or before Outside the Continental United States (U.S.) deployments.

(e) Coordinate formal Level III and Level IV school attendance for those commanders who are required, by the references to attend.

(f) Participate in the MCAS Cherry Point Crisis Management Team.

(g) Ensure 2d MAW subordinate commands located on MCAS Beaufort and MCAS New River have AT plans in accordance with this Order and their respective installations.

(3) 2d MAW Group Commanding Officers (COs):

(a) Commanders shall designate a commissioned Officer, Staff Non-Commissioned Officer (SNCO), or civilian Staff Officer in writing as the ATO who shall be trained in AT procedures in a formal service-approved Level II training course. Group Commanders will also ensure subordinate squadrons have a designated formal service-approved Level II trained ATO.

(b) Commanders shall conduct field and staff training to exercise AT plans. AT training and exercises shall be provided the same emphasis afforded combat task training and executed with the intent to identify shortfalls impacting the protection of personnel and assets.

AUG 10 01

(c) Commanders shall review their own AT program and plans at least annually. They shall likewise review the AT program of their immediate subordinates at least annually.

(d) Group Commanders not located on MCAS Cherry Point, will make liaison with their respective Station ATO and/or Provost Marshal and coordinate their plan to act in accordance with Air Station Orders.

(e) Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 2 (MWHS-2) will develop and implement the AT program, assessments, plans and training programs for the 2d MAW headquarters and will have a designated ATO.

c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Alert Notification Procedures. See Annex C.
- (2) Rules of Engagement. See Annex E.
- (3) Baseline Security Posture. See Annex C.
- (4) FPCON Implementation. See Annex C.
- (5) Incident Response and Consequence Management. See Annex C.
- (6) Installation AT Exercise. See Annex G.
- (7) Intelligence. See Annex B.
- (8) Civil-Military Operations. See Annex F.
- (9) Public Affairs. See Annex H.

5. Administration and Logistics

a. Administration. This Order contains operational information for official 2d MAW use only; thus distribution is limited to U.S. Marine Corps activities.

b. Personnel. Successful execution of an AT program requires a full-time ATO with staff support. Further assistance can be obtained by contacting the Station Physical Security Office and CBRNE Office.

c. Logistics. None.

6. Command and Signal

a. Command. This Order applies to all 2d MAW activities, commands, units and personnel (to include personnel from other services and civilian employees serving with Marine Corps units).

b. Signal. This Order is effective the date signed.


R. W. REGAN
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: B

ANNEX A: TASK ORGANIZATION

1. Pre-Incident

a. AT Working Groups (ATWG). The 2d MAW ATFP Officer will attend and be a member of the Station ATWG in order to facilitate planning and response to AT initiatives. The 2d MAW ATFP Officer is also responsible to report all pertinent information to:

- (1) Deputy AC/S G-3.
- (2) MWHS-2 ATO.
- (3) Marine Aircraft Group 14 ATO (MAG-14).
- (4) Marine Aircraft Control Group 28 ATO (MACG-28).
- (5) Marine Wing Support Group 27 ATO (MWSG-27).
- (6) Marine Aircraft Group 26 ATO (MAG-26).
- (7) Marine Aircraft Group 29 ATO (MAG-29).
- (8) Marine Aircraft Group 31 ATO (MAG-31).

MAG-26, MAG-29 and MAG-31 shall also attend MCAS Beaufort and MCAS New River ATWG meetings (as appropriate) to fulfill their site specific planning and operational needs.

b. Command Relationships. When not in a state of emergency, Marine Corps Installations East (MCIEAST), assigns emergency preparedness duties and responsibilities, directs emergency planning, develops the emergency management command and control structure, conducts training and maintains an effective emergency response capability. In time of an emergency, MCIEAST, directs and controls emergency operations, disseminates emergency information to the public and coordinates with outside agencies for external assistance as required.

(1) During the incident and post-incident phase, the Commanding Generals (CGs) primary agency will be the Crisis Management Team (CMT). The CMT, through the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), will exercise command and control during the incident and post-incident phases. The scope and

AUG 10 2011

severity of the incident will determine if and when the EOC will be activated. The Wing ATO, along with other essential Wing personnel, are required to be present when the EOC is activated.

(2) In all cases, it is important to remember MCIEAST has the responsibility for protecting 2d MAW personnel and has ultimate authority over all persons on the air stations, civilian and military, especially during an emergency.

2. Increased FPCON and Post-Incident

a. CMT. The CMT will be formed when a crisis occurs or appears imminent and as directed by the air station CO. Attendance is required by the Officer of the Day; representatives from the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), Manpower Directorate, Operations Directorate, Provost Marshall's Office (PMO), Joint Public Affairs Office, Facilities Directorate, Supply Directorate and Station Inspector. The CMT is the focal point for all actions during a crisis situation and will work out of the EOC. As already stated, the 2d MAW ATO is required to be in the EOC.

b. Response. Regardless of the nature of the situation, the incident site of a terrorist attack must be treated as a crime scene. The initial response phase begins when the initial response element deploys to the scene of the incident. If hostile forces are present, the senior Security Forces Officer will remain on-scene command until the threat is neutralized. The On-Scene Commander (OSC), the Air Station Commanders designated representative, will exercise command and control of the entire incident scene. For any terrorist-related and/or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) event, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is the lead federal agency and will assume overall command once its representatives arrive at the site. However, control of military forces will always remain under military authority.

ANNEX B: INTELLIGENCE1. Pre-Incident

a. Terrorism Threat Levels. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) terrorism threat level classification system is a set of standardized terms used to quantify the level of the estimated terrorism threat on a country-by-country basis. Terrorism threat levels are the intelligence community's system for articulating and categorizing the terrorist threat worldwide. They represent a methodology for assessing the terrorist threat to personnel, material and interest based on a combination of the threat analysis factors. The terrorism threat level is determined for a particular area based on the presence or absence of these threat assessment factors. However, terrorism threat levels should not be confused with FPCON that will be discussed in Annex C.

(1) High. An Anti-U.S. terrorist group is operationally active and uses large casualty producing attacks as their preferred method of operation. There is a substantial Department of Defense (DoD) presence and the operating environment favors the terrorist.

(2) Significant. An Anti-U.S. terrorist group is operationally active and attacks personnel as their preferred method of operation or a group uses large casualty producing attacks as their preferred method and has limited operational activity. The operating environment is neutral.

(3) Moderate. Terrorist groups are present but there is no indication of Anti-U.S. activity. The operating environment favors the host-nation or U.S.

(4) Low. No terrorist group is detected or the group activity is non-threatening. This system should not be confused with the Department of Homeland Security Advisory System. The Department of Homeland Security, when in possession of credible information, will raise or lower the threat condition applicable to the U.S. specifically. The above system is used by the military establishment to classify the threat to military personnel in overseas locations.

b. Vulnerability Assessment. The vulnerability assessment is the foundation upon which the antiterrorism plan is built and is the first step in the risk management process. Assessments consider the full range of identified and projected terrorism

Enclosure (1)

threats against a specific location or installation, personnel, facilities and other assets. The assessment identifies vulnerabilities that may be exploited by threat groups and recommend options to eliminate or reduce those vulnerabilities. Commanders shall conduct local vulnerability assessments annually.

(1) The best tool to use when conducting a vulnerability assessment is the Mission, Symbolism, History, Accessibility, Recognizability, Population and Proximity (MSHARPP) Methodology. This is used to identify and prioritize force protection concerns and consideration is given to the local threat, likely means of attack available and "attractiveness" affecting the disposition of potential targets. Below is the 2d MAW Headquarters Vulnerability Assessment:

LOCATION	MISSION	SYMBOLISM	HISTORY	ACCESSIBILITY	RECOGNIZABILITY	POPULATION	PROXIMITY	TOTAL
HQ Bldg 80	2	4	1	5	3	4	3	22
Flightline	5	5	1	3	4	3	3	24
Barracks	2	2	3	4	4	4	3	22
Multiple Aircraft	4	4	2	3	5	2	3	23

c. Threat Assessment. Conducting a terrorist threat assessment is the second step in the antiterrorism management process. Conducting a threat assessment aids in developing an evaluation of the potential terrorist threat to the assets identified in the vulnerability assessment. Commanders are required to conduct a threat assessment annually, as well as before any overseas exercise and/or deployment. The assessment will identify the full spectrum of known or estimated terrorist capabilities, including weapons and tactics. The following are tools that aid in conducting a threat assessment:

(1) Multiple Threat Alert Center (MTAC) Suspicious Incident Reports (SIRs). The MTAC, through the local Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) agent, distributes these reports that provide current operational intelligence on terrorist and related unconventional warfare threats to personnel and assets. These reports are published as soon as suspicious activity is reported.

(2) Quarterly Threat Assessment. On Cherry Point, the NCIS field agent publishes a quarterly threat assessment. This may or may not apply at other locations. However, NCIS is required to conduct a threat assessment on an annual basis.

AUG 10 2011

(3) MTAC Security Bulletin. Also published by NCIS and posted on the DoD unclassified Force Protection and Physical Security website at: <https://dodpse.spawar.navy.mil>.

d. Criticality Assessment. This is the third step where a survey of assets and determination of the value of the assets is done. This assessment determines whether or not an attack on a component will cause degradation in mission capability by assessing the assets, importance, effect of loss and recoverability. The end product is the identification of assets that could become potential terrorist targets, which is used to develop a prioritized list of Mission Essential Vulnerable Areas (MEVA). These are areas/assets critical to the unit's mission. The air station has a comprehensive listing of MEVAs listed in reference (h). However, the units need to compile their own listing and establish the values according to the unit mission. Again, the MSHARPP matrix is an appropriate tool to use for establishing values.

(1) For example, the mission of 2d MAW is: "to conduct air operations in support of the Fleet Marine Forces to include Offensive Air Support, Anti-Air Warfare, Assault Support, Aerial Reconnaissance including active and passive Electronic Countermeasures and the control of aircraft and missiles." Therefore, our MEVAs are listed and prioritized as follows:

MEVA LIST								
AREA/ASSET	MISSION	SYMBOLISM	HISTORY	ACCESSIBILITY	RECOGNIZABILITY	POPULATION	PROXIMITY	TOTAL
Aircraft	4	3	1	2	3	1	2	16
Personnel	2	4	3	2	3	2	2	18
HQ Bldg 80	2	1	1	2	3	2	2	13

e. Risk Assessment. This is the final step in the risk management process. The risk assessment provides information that is useful to the Commander in making resource allocation decisions designed to protect personnel and assets from possible terrorist threats in a resource-constrained environment. Additionally, the risk assessment will help the AT Officer to identify countermeasures necessary to mitigate vulnerabilities, their costs and will become the basis by which protective measures are planned and their implementation prioritized. The risk assessment analyzes these four elements: (1) the terrorist threat; (2) criticality of assets; (3) vulnerability of facilities and (4) the ability to deter, employ countermeasures, mitigate and recover from a terrorist attack. The results of the MSHARPP process provide the best information for this

Enclosure (1)

portion of the risk assessment. The end result will be a determination of "High", "Medium" or "Low" risk levels that can be used to justify resource and funding requirements. The overall risk assessment for 2d MAW is shown in the table below:

Overall Risk Assessment								
	Importance	Effect	Recoverability	Construction	Accessibility	Recognizable	Total	Risk Level
Aircraft	10	10	8	8	8	10	54	High
Personnel	10	10	9	0	8	10	47	Medium
HQ Bldg	7	9	7	7	9	8	47	Medium
Barracks	7	10	9	9	10	10	55	High
Flightline	10	8	7	7	8	10	50	High

The three most vital assets to the command are aircraft, the flightline and personnel. They are given a rating of "High." One of the reasons "Personnel" did not rate as high is the fact that there are no construction considerations, per se, in replacing personnel. Also, personnel are not considered to be at high risk either out in town or on base due to the current environment; nor do our personnel congregate in such numbers as to make them a viable target to terrorists. If a terrorist wanted to target our personnel and to attain a high casualty rate, a terrorist would target facilities where personnel tend to assemble in high numbers, i.e. the barracks, the exchange, hangar offices and the health clinic. Since this plan applies only to 2d MAW, station facilities will not be considered, but can be found in the air station AT plan.

2. Increased FPCON and Post-Incident

a. When directed by the DoD or by the COMMCABEAST in receipt of credible evidence, the FPCONs can be raised in order to protect station personnel and facilities from possible attack. In this event, physical security measures will be implemented as prescribed in the FPCON action sets described in detail in Annex C. Station PMO has the responsibility for securing the perimeter of the base and controlling entry of all personnel. To aid in this duty, Groups will be required to provide individual augments to stand post. The following are known tasks for increases in the FPCONs:

(1) Group ATOs/S-1s provide security force augments to PMO as directed by G-1.

(2) Group ATOs liaison with unit ATOs and evaluate vulnerabilities, MEVAs and risk assessment to determine requirements for internal security.

(3) Post security around MEVAs (appropriately screening all sentry personnel).

(4) Determine essential personnel and provide access rosters for work areas.

b. Once an incident occurs, there are certain response measures that must be followed to effectively deal with the situation. These measures are designed to facilitate the flow of information within and between all levels of response. Most of these steps will be performed by PMO personnel, station personnel and/or local law enforcement:

(1) Report the incident.

(2) Determine nature and scope of the incident response required.

(3) Establish the Emergency Operations Center.

(4) Coordinate emergency response personnel and agencies.

(5) Dispatch emergency personnel and equipment to the incident site.

(6) Protect personnel and equipment at the incident site.

(7) Evacuate nonessential personnel.

(8) Provide incident briefings and situation updates.

(9) Provide medical treatment and transportation to medical facilities.

(10) Manage the emergency.

(11) Restore normal operations and reconstitute the ability to perform antiterrorism functions.

(12) Incident debriefings and after-action reports.

c. Care must be taken to treat the location of the incident as a crime scene in order to preserve evidence. This process will aid a follow-on criminal investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). There are three distinct phases to incident response:

(1) Phase I. The commitment of locally available resources including watch-sections, available military law enforcement, security force patrols, explosive ordnance disposal and available backup units.

(2) Phase II. Begins when the emergency operations center is activated. It includes the augmentation of the initial response force by additional law enforcement and security personnel and/or special reaction team.

(3) Phase III. The commitment of the specialized FBI or Department of Defense counterterrorist forces, during the phase; steps will be taken to terminate the incident through negotiation, assault or other actions.

The following table illustrates the relationships when dealing with an incident:

Incident Location	Initial Response	Containment of Incident	Incident Resolution	Incident Investigation	Prosecution
DoD Installation (CONUS)	DoD military or civilian security forces	Initially DoD military or civilian security forces with transition to FBI or civilian law enforcement	FBI or other appropriate civilian law enforcement dependent on jurisdiction	Federal Bureau of Investigation	Department of Justice
DoD Personnel off-base	Local law enforcement or FBI	Local law enforcement or FBI	Local law enforcement or FBI	Local law enforcement for state or local law violations; FBI for federal violations	Local state's attorney for state or local law violations; DOJ for federal violations

Annex C: Destructive Weather

1. The main threat in regard to destructive weather in the 2d MAW area of interest is hurricanes. The hurricane season starts 1 June and lasts until 30 November. When destructive weather conditions exist, the vulnerability of the air station to terrorist attack increases. Even though the main asset of the installation, aircraft, may be evacuated, personnel are usually sent home, leaving many areas/buildings unmanned and unguarded. Also, in the process of preparing for the upcoming storm, personnel are more concerned with individual/family preparations instead of maintaining vigilance to their surroundings. Also, the day of and hours before the storm, a terrorist could find a large concentration of civilians, Marines and Sailors at the commissary, increasing its value as a target.

a. Keeping installation Marines and Sailors informed of the action sets that accompany each destructive weather condition will contribute in maintaining order on base and give them an appropriate planning window in which to accomplish recommended preparations.

2. The Commander, MCIEAST sets destructive weather conditions for MCAS Cherry Point, MCAS New River and MCAS Beaufort in response to current and forecast weather. When destructive weather condition IV is set, the CO, MCAS Cherry Point will activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), which will be located in building 91. The commercial phone numbers are (252) 466-5216/5217/5218 (DSN: 582).

a. Marines, Sailors and Commanders can access the local weather report, to include destructive weather conditions online at <https://www.cherrypoint.usmc.mil/weather>. When planning for a hurricane, it's best to have a family/personal disaster kit prepared at the start of the hurricane season. Many times, an area has only 24 to 36 hours to prepare for the arrival of a hurricane. More information on planning can be found at <http://www.fema.gov/areyouready>. This is an online step-by-step guide on disaster preparedness with a chapter devoted to hurricanes.

b. Destructive Weather Condition V. Normal operations during hurricane season.

c. Destructive Weather Condition IV. The trend indicates a possible threat of destructive winds (i.e. hurricane/tropical storm/storm) within 72 hours.

Enclosure (1)

d. Destructive Weather Condition III. Destructive winds are possible in the general area within 48 hours.

e. Destructive Weather Condition II. Destructive winds are anticipated in the general area within 24 hours.

f. Destructive Weather Condition I. Destructive winds are anticipated in the general area within 12 hours. When this condition is set, personnel may be secured on base or sent home.

3. The following categories are assigned to hurricanes to assist in adequate planning for the area that may be hit.

a. Category One. Winds 74-95 mph. Storm surge generally 4-5 feet above normal. No real damage to building structures. Damaged primarily to unanchored mobile homes, shrubbery and trees. Some coastal road flooding and minor pier damage.

b. Category Two. Winds 96-110 mph. Storm surge generally 6-8 feet above normal. Some roofing material, door and window damage of buildings. Considerable damage to mobile homes, poorly constructed signs and piers. Small craft in unprotected anchorages break moorings. Coastal and low-lying escape routes flood 2-4 hours before arrival of the hurricane center.

c. Category Three. Winds 111-130 mph. Storm surge generally 9-12 feet above normal. Some structural damage to small residences and utility buildings. Mobile homes destroyed. Flooding near the coast destroys smaller structures with larger structures damaged by floating debris. Evacuation of low-lying residences with several blocks of shoreline may be required.

d. Category Four. Winds 131-155 mph. Storm surge generally 13-18 feet above normal. Complete roof structure failures on small residences. Extensive damage to doors and windows. Terrain lower than 10 feet above sea level may be flooded requiring massive evacuation of residential areas as far inland as 6 miles.

e. Category Five. Winds greater than 155 mph. Storm surge generally greater than 18 feet above normal. Complete roof failure on many residences and industrial buildings. Massive evacuation of residential areas on low ground within 5-10 miles of the shoreline.

4. Guidance for the issuance of rations is usually published annually at the start of the hurricane season. Guidance will be published via naval message.

AUG 10 2011

Annex C: Operations

1. AT. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State approved a program standardizing the military services' identification of and recommended responses to terrorist threats against U.S. personnel and facilities OCONUS. This program facilitates coordination and support for antiterrorism activities and is called Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs). The Department of Defense followed and eliminated the system of Threat Conditions (THREATCONs) and adopted FPCONs in order to eliminate confusion and establish uniformity. The following table identifies each FPCON and specific measures to be taken. When command-specific measures are identified, the table becomes "Confidential" and must be maintained in a secure environment. Therefore, only the generic version of AT action sets is included in this Order.

2. In addition to basic FPCON procedures, a variety of other tasks may need to be performed at aviation facilities. This is particularly true for airbases located in areas where the threat of terrorist attack is high. Regardless, the Department of Defense has established procedures specific to aviation facilities within Continental United States (CONUS).

<p>FPCON ALPHA: Applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities; the nature and extent of which are unpredictable; and circumstances do not justify full implementation of BRAVO measures. The measures for this condition must be capable indefinitely.</p>	<p>Measure 1: Remind all personnel and dependents to be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers. Watch for unidentified vehicles on or in the vicinity of installations. Watch for abandoned parcels or suitcases and any unusual activity.</p> <p>Measure 2: The duty Officer or personnel with access to building plans as well as the plans for area evacuations must be available at all times.</p>
---	---

Enclosure (1)

	<p>Key personnel should be available to seal off an area immediately. Key personnel required to implement security plans should be on-call and readily available.</p> <p>Measure 3: Secure buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.</p> <p>Measure 4: Increase security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering the installation and unclassified areas under the jurisdiction of the United States.</p> <p>Measure 5: Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic.</p> <p>Measure 6: As Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAMs) apply measures 14, 15, 17, or 18 from BRAVO either individually or in combination with each other.</p> <p>Measure 7: Review all plans, orders, personnel details, and logistics requirements related to the introduction of higher FPCONS.</p> <p>Measure 8: review and implement security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate.</p>
--	--

AUG 10 2011

	<p>Measure 9: As appropriate, consult local authorities on the threat and mutual antiterrorism measures.</p> <p>Measure 10: To be determined.</p>
<p>FPCON BRAVO: Applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.</p>	<p>Measure 11: Repeat measure 1 and warn personnel of any other potential form of terrorist attack.</p> <p>Measure 12: Keep all personnel involved in implementing antiterrorist contingency plans on call.</p> <p>Measure 13: Check plans for the implementation of the next higher FPCON.</p> <p>Measure 14: Move cars and objects at least 25 meters from buildings particularly buildings of a sensitive or prestigious nature. Consider centralized parking.</p> <p>Measure 15: Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.</p> <p>Measure 16: At the beginning and end of each workday, as well as at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages.</p> <p>Measure 17: Examine mail for letter or parcel bombs.</p>

Enclosure (1)

AUG 10 2011

Measure 18: Check all deliveries to messes, clubs, etc. Advise dependents to check home deliveries.

Measure 19: Increase surveillance of domestic accommodations, schools, messes, clubs, and other soft targets to improve deterrence and defense, and to build confidence among staff and dependents.

Measure 20: Make staff and dependents aware of the general situation in order to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm.

Measure 21: At an early stage, inform members of local security committees of actions being taken. Explain reasons for actions.

Measure 22: Physically inspect visitors and randomly inspect their suitcases, parcels, and other containers. Ensure proper dignity is maintained, and if possible, ensure female visitors are inspected only by a female qualified to conduct physical inspections.

Measure 23: Operate random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.

Enclosure (1)

	<p>Measure 24: Protect off-base military personnel and military vehicles in accordance with prepared plans. Remind drivers to lock vehicles and check vehicles before entering or exiting the vehicle.</p> <p>Measure 25: Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate.</p> <p>Measure 26: Brief personnel who may augment guard forces on the use of deadly force. Ensure there is no misunderstanding of these instructions.</p> <p>Measure 27: As appropriate, consult local authorities on the threat and mutual antiterrorism measures.</p> <p>Measure 28-29: To be determined.</p>
<p>FPCON CHARLIE: This condition applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is likely. Implementation of these measures for more than a short period probably will create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.</p>	<p>Measure 30: Continue, or introduce all measure in FPCON BRAVO.</p> <p>Measure 31: Keep all personnel responsible for implementing antiterrorist plans at their places of duty.</p> <p>Measure 32: Limit access points to the absolute minimum.</p> <p>Measure 33: Strictly enforce control of entry. Randomly search vehicles.</p>

AUG 10 2011

	<p>Measure 34: enforce centralized parking of vehicles away from sensitive buildings.</p> <p>Measure 35: Issue weapons to guards. Local orders should include specific orders on issue of ammunition.</p> <p>Measure 36: Increase patrolling of the installation.</p> <p>Measure 37: Protect all designated vulnerable points. Give special attention to vulnerable points outside the military establishment.</p> <p>Measure 38: Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.</p> <p>Measure 39: Consult local authorities about closing public (and military) roads and sites more vulnerable to attacks.</p>
--	--

FPCONS ALPHA AND BRAVO:

Briefing and Liaison:

(1) Brief all personnel on the threat, especially pilots, ground support crews, and air traffic controllers.

(2) Inform local police of the threat. Coordinate plans to safeguard aircraft flight paths into and out of air stations.

(3) Ensure duty officers are always available by telephone.

(4) Prepare to activate contingency plans and issue detailed air traffic control procedures if appropriate.

(5) Be prepared to receive and direct aircraft from other stations.

Precautions Inside the Perimeter:

(1) Perform thorough and regular inspection of areas within the perimeter from which attacks on aircraft can be made.

(2) Take action to ensure no extremists armed with surface-to-air missiles can operate against aircraft within the perimeter.

(3) Establish checkpoints at all entrances and inspect all passes and permits. Identify documents of individuals entering the area--no exceptions.

(4) Search all vehicles, briefcases, packages, etc., entering the area.

AUG 10 2011

(5) Erect barriers around potential targets if at all possible.

(6) Maintain firefighting equipment and conduct practice drills.

(7) Hold practice alerts within the perimeter.

Precautions Outside the Perimeter:

(1) Conduct, with local police, regular inspections of the perimeter—especially the area adjacent to flight paths.

(2) Advise the local police of any areas outside the perimeter where attacks could be mounted and which cannot be avoided by aircraft on takeoff or landing.

(3) Advise aircrews to report any unusual activity near approach and overshoot areas.

FPCON CHARLIE:

Briefing and Liaison:

(1) Brief all personnel on the increased threat.

(2) Inform local police of increased threat.

(3) Coordinate with local police on any precautionary measures taken outside the airfield's perimeter.

(4) Implement appropriate flying countermeasures specified in SOPs when directed by air traffic controllers.

**Precautions Inside the AUG 10 2011
Perimeter:**

(1) Inspect all vehicles and buildings on a regular basis.

(2) Detail additional guards to be on call at short notice and consider augmenting firefighting details.

(3) Conduct random patrols within the airfield perimeter and maintain continuous observation of approach and overshoot areas.

(4) Reduce flying to essential operational flights only. Cease circuit flying if appropriate.

(5) Escort all visitors.

(6) Close relief landing grounds where appropriate.

(7) Check airfield diversion state.

**Precautions Outside the
Perimeter:**

(1) Be prepared to react to requests for assistance.

(2) Provide troops to assist local police in searching for terrorists on approaches outside the perimeter of military airfields.

<p>FPCON DELTA:</p>	<p>Briefing and Liaison:</p> <p>(1) Brief all personnel on the very high levels of threat.</p> <p>(2) Inform local police of the increased threat.</p> <p>Precautions Inside the Perimeter:</p> <p>(1) Cease all flying except for specifically authorized operational sorties.</p> <p>(2) Implement, if necessary, appropriate flying countermeasures.</p> <p>(3) Be prepared to accept aircraft diverted from other stations.</p> <p>(4) Be prepared to deploy light aircraft and helicopters for surveillance tasks or to move internal security forces.</p> <p>Precautions Outside the Perimeter:</p> <p>(1) Close military roads allowing access to the airbase.</p>
----------------------------	--

3. For 2d MAW specific FPCON action sets, contact the 2d MAW ATFP Officer. Subordinate groups and squadrons are also encouraged to establish action sets relevant to their mission and areas of operations. For Example, MWSG-27 will assist MCAS Cherry Point with the placement of barriers during raised FPCON's. MACG-28 will assist Station with Traffic Control Points north of the Roosevelt Blvd/6th Avenue intersection.

AUG 10 2011

Annex C: Operations

Appendix 3: Special Threat Situations

1. Response to special threat situations is critical. Depending on the magnitude of the threat, external resources from local, state and federal agencies may be required. When these situations are of sufficient magnitude to require resources beyond the control of the Provost Marshal, it is essential that the installation be prepared to effectively coordinate all required internal and external resources. Due to the installation's role in national security, threats identified range from dissident and protest activities, bomb threats, hostage threats and WMD. WMD will be covered in Appendix 4 of Annex C.

2. Dissident and Protest Activities. Any dissident or protest activity on the air station which tends to interfere with or prevent the orderly accomplishment of the station mission, is of questionable loyalty or which may adversely affect the health, morale or welfare of personnel, is prohibited. At the same time, air station personnel must be informed of the dangers involved in personal involvement in such activities and/or the danger presented by others' involvement. The following are rules the air station CO has established regarding questionable activities:

a. Distribution of printed materials through other than official outlets must have the approval of the 2d MAW CG. The 2d MAW CG will determine whether the material presents a clear and present danger to the loyalty, discipline or morale of military personnel or if distribution would interfere with the accomplishment of the military mission. If the CG determines that an attempt will be made or has been made to distribute such printed material, it shall be impounded.

b. The CG has the authority to place establishments "off limits" when the activities taking place there may have an adverse affect on the members' health, morale, welfare or otherwise present a clear danger to loyalty or discipline of a member or military unit.

c. Military personnel must reject participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes, discrimination based on race, creed, sex, religion or national origin, groups that advocate the overthrow of the United States government, advocates the use of force or violence to attain their goals or

Enclosure (1)

AUG 10 2001

otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. Commanders have authority to employ the full range of administrative procedures, including separation or appropriate disciplinary action, against military personnel who actively participate in such groups.

d. Any demonstration or activity on the air station that could result in interference with or prevention of good order, discipline or loyalty is prohibited. It is a crime for any person to enter the air station for any purpose prohibited by law and for any person to reenter the air station after having been barred by order of the CG.

e. Members of the armed forces are prohibited from participating in off-station demonstrations when such activities constitute a breach of law and order, when violence is likely to result or when they are in uniform.

3. Bomb Threats. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, bomb threats have become a major concern to all government agencies and private organizations. Whether a bomb threat is the act of a terrorist, subversive organization, mentally unstable individual or a hoax, sharpening our skills at handling such threats is necessary. The following is a guideline of questions to ask when faced with a bomb threat. It is not all-inclusive, but will aid in identifying area(s) to evacuate and the follow-on investigation of the threat.

When is the bomb going to explode?	
Where is it right now?	
What does it look like?	
What kind of bomb is it?	
What will cause it to explode?	
Did you place the bomb? Why?	
What is your address?	
What is your name?	
Exact wording of the threat:	
Sex of caller:	
Race:	
Age:	
Length of call:	
Number at which call was received:	
Time:	
Date:	

Enclosure (1)

If a Marine or sailor is faced with this situation, it is important that he/she know that the best reaction is to remain calm and to get as much information from the caller as possible. And if the Marine or sailor can keep the caller on the phone persons trained at crisis negotiation can then take over. Each unit should also develop a plan for evacuation of personnel in the event of a bomb threat.

4. Hostage Threat. Some terrorist groups advocate taking hostages to achieve their goals. But, on the whole, taking hostages here within the United States has little payback and is a high-risk venture. Regardless, it's important to know how to handle this situation in the event that persons designated as high-risk personnel on the air station are taken.

Who is this?	
Where are you calling from?	
Is this a prank?	
How do I know this is not a prank?	
May I talk to the hostage?	
Is the hostage okay?	
What are your demands?	
Will you call back in 15 minutes?	
How can I contact you if I have trouble meeting your demands?	
Exact wording of demand:	
Sex of caller:	
Race:	
Age:	
Length of call:	
Number at which call was received:	
Time:	
Date:	

The following threat information table is a tool used to help in both of the above situations and is intended for assisting military or local police with their investigation. It can be useful information used to identify the person or group making the threat.

Which unit or installation is involved?	
Nature of the threat?	
Time or period of the threat:	
Who made the threat?	
Date and time of call:	
Voice characteristics:	
1. Was the tone normal?	
2. Did it sound disguised or muffled?	
3. Was it high-pitched or stuttering?	
4. Did it sound nervous?	
5. Was it slurred or did it indicate the person was under the influence of drugs or alcohol?	
6. Was there evidence of excitement such as hurried speech?	
Did the caller give the impression that the message was being read?	
Did the voice have a pronounced or recognizable accent?	
7. What type of accent?	
Was there any indication that the person was young or old?	
Were there background noises?	
Were there any noises that would indicate someone was with the caller?	
Did the caller display a detailed knowledge of the mission or layout of the unit or establishment?	
Is there any other pertinent information?	

Annex C: Operations

Appendix 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and CBRNE

1. WMD

a. The Oklahoma City bombing and the World Trade Center and Pentagon attack have highlighted our vulnerability to attack by WMD. These two examples are methods becoming more popular among terrorists, domestic or foreign. Engineering a WMD is relatively easy, inexpensive and can yield a high-casualty rate. Chemical/biological weapons and explosive devices constitute a threat of a WMD. And even though advance notification of a WMD threat is unlikely, subordinate commands are instructed to develop a response plan in the event that a WMD is used in their area of operation. This includes notification procedures and evacuation routes. Unit ATOs also need to be aware of the following assumptions:

(1) A WMD scenario will exceed the crisis response/consequence management capabilities of station resources.

(2) Extensive DoD, state and federal support will be required to cope with a WMD scenario.

(3) Chemical and biological WMD incidents especially pose a significant problem for first responders.

b. Commanders and ATOs can use the following table as a guideline in mitigating the effects of a WMD incident:

Pre-Incident	Post-Incident
Know the installation, command, group, squadron and unit threat assessment.	Assess terrorist intentions and capabilities for further/secondary attacks using WMD.
Establish appropriate reporting channels for timely and accurate dissemination of intelligence/incident information.	Update threat assessments based on latest information.
Know the threat level, current FPCON and actions sets that go with each FPCON.	

AUG 10 2011

Identify required equipment for AT planning and response elements; identify resources available through augmentation.	Identify shortfalls and arrange for replacement of damaged equipment during the incident.
Identify the AT response chain of command.	Execute chain of command.
Assign AT-specific tasks and responsibilities.	
Establish emergency notification roster of all appropriate personnel and rehearse emergency contact procedures.	Plan on being confined to base or restricted from entering due to incident.
Identify a primary and secondary area that can serve as a command post. Be familiar with the procedures of managing an incident site.	Assemble all appropriate personnel. Be prepared to relinquish command to the Incident Site Commander (ISC).
Establish and conduct individual collective protection programs.	
Organize and train all units that will operate together during an incident and establish a program to exercise the plan annually.	Initiate a react force to secure the areas and buildings around the incident site.
Develop a barrier plan for the unit vulnerable areas and ensure required resources can be obtained.	Establish and enforce the barrier plan.
Develop a guard force for the unit.	
Identify primary and alternate means of communications; plan for communications and equipment redundancy.	Monitor frequencies and nets; limit non-essential use of nets.
Establish evacuation plans and associated courses of action; establish secondary evacuation routes in event of contaminated areas.	Recover to pre-incident unit status.
Determine logistics requirements for each AT planning and response element.	Submit logistics request as appropriate.

c. There are two aspects of incident management. Crisis Management includes those response measures or actions required to identify, acquire and plan the use of all resources needed to anticipate, prevent or resolve a threat or act of terrorism; it

Enclosure (1)

is primarily a law enforcement response which focuses on the criminal aspects of the incident. Consequence Management includes those response measures required to protect the health and safety of DoD personnel and families, and to maintain and restore the capability of continuing the mission.

d. The FBI will assume the crisis management role in the United States, its territories and possessions, or other places that have U.S. jurisdiction while the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will be responsible for consequence management. The Federal Response Plan will be activated as required by the National Command Authority. There is also the option of the state's governor to activate the National Guard to support response efforts.

e. In accordance with reference (m), the installation will submit an OPREP-3 report where national-level interest has been determined. Therefore, the installation will send an OPREP-3 (Flag Word PINNACLE) directly to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The initial report must not be delayed to gain additional information. Follow-up reports can be submitted as additional information becomes available. All OPREP-3 reports will be submitted as soon as possible and sent FLASH or IMMEDIATE precedence. The Message Address: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3 NMCC//

2. CBRNE

a. Replacing the acronym NBC is CBRNE: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive weapons. Terrorists are becoming more willing to resort to these types of weapons and their use in a future incident is likely. And, just like WMD, the above assumptions apply as well as the process in mitigating the effects of a CBRNE weapon. The following tables are provided to associate possible symptoms with one of the three types of weapons (symptoms for a nuclear incident are omitted for obvious reasons).

(1) Indicators of a Possible Chemical Incident:

Dead animals/birds/fish	Numerous animals, (wild and domestic) birds and fish in the same area.
-------------------------	--

Lack of insect life	If normal insect activity is missing, then check the ground/water surface/shore line for dead insects. If near water, check for dead fish/aquatic birds.
Physical symptoms	Numerous individuals experiencing unexplained water-like blisters, wheals, pinpointed pupils, choking, respiratory ailments, and/or rashes.
Mass casualties	Numerous individuals exhibiting unexplained serious health problems ranging from nausea to disorientation to difficulty in breathing to convulsions to death.
Pattern of casualties	Casualties distributed in a pattern that may be associated with possible agent dissemination methods.
Illness associated with confined geographic area	Lower attack rates for people working indoors versus outdoors, or vice versa.
Unusual liquid droplets	Numerous surfaces exhibit only droplets/film; numerous water surfaces have an oily film.
Areas that look different in appearance	Not just a patch of dead weeds, but trees, shrubs, bushes, food crops, and/or lawns that are dead, discolored, or withered.
Unexplained odors	Smells may range from fruity to flowery to sharp/pungent to garlic/horseradish to bitter almonds/peach to new mown hay completely out of character with the surroundings.

AUG 10 2011

Low-lying clouds	Low-lying cloud/fog-like condition that is not explained by its surroundings.
Unusual metal debris	Unexplained bomb/munitions-like material, especially if it contains a liquid.

(2) Indicators of a Possible Biological Incident:

Unusual numbers of sick or dying people or animals	Any number of symptoms may occur. Casualties may occur hours to days to weeks after an incident has occurred. Additional symptoms likely to occur include unexplained gastrointestinal illnesses and upper respiratory problems similar to flu/colds.
Unscheduled and unusual spray being disseminated	Especially if outdoors during periods of darkness.
Abandoned spray devices	Devices will have no distinct odors.

(3) Indicators of a Possible Radiological Incident:

Unusual numbers of sick or dying people or animals	Casualties may occur hours to days or weeks after an incident has occurred. Additional symptoms include skin reddening and, in severe cases, vomiting.
Unusual metal debris	Unexplained bomb/munitions-like material.
Radiation symbols	Containers may display a radiation symbol.
Heat emitting material	Material that seems to emit heat without any sign of an external heating source.
Glowing material/particles	If the material is strongly radioactive, then it may emit a radio luminescence.

Enclosure (1)

AUG 10 2011

b. Per reference (c), installation Commanders are to appoint a Commissioned Officer, Non-Commissioned Officer or civilian Staff Officer in writing as the Emergency Disaster Planning Officer with CBRNE emergency response program management responsibilities. This appointed individual oversees the CBRNE Emergency Response Working Group, which assists in the development of emergency response initiatives. An annual exercise is conducted to evaluate the installation's emergency response.

AUG 10 2011

Annex C: Operations

Appendix 5: Physical Security and Flight Line Security1. Physical Security

a. Though the Air Station has a highly visible security and law enforcement unit, the success of any security program depends on the support of its policies and cooperation with security forces from all command echelons and employees. Reference (i) contains detailed guidance on physical security and crime prevention topics.

(1) Crime Prevention/Physical Security Council (CP/PSC): A combined CP/PSC has been established and administered by the Security Department. The PSC meets quarterly. The objective of the CP/PSC is to coordinate and implement initiatives that support the installation's physical security and loss prevention programs. Other functions include:

- (a) Provide guidance for the development and distribution of the installation threat assessment.
- (b) Develop the installation physical security plan.
- (c) Evaluate the effectiveness of the installation security program and ensure regulatory compliance.
- (d) Review installation entry and visitor control procedures.
- (e) Review existing regulations, directives and plans to ensure that the installation can support a terrorism counteraction program suited to the local situation.

b. Restricted areas may be established in writing by a commanding officer within his/her jurisdiction. The Director of Security or Provost Marshal must be informed in writing of all designated restricted areas. There are three classifications of restricted areas: Level Three, Level Two or Level One.

(1) Level Three (III). The most secure type of restricted area. The most appropriate application is to situations where access into the restricted area constitutes or is considered to constitute, actual access to what is being protected.

Enclosure (1)

(2) Level Two (II). The second most secure type of restricted area. The most appropriate application is to situations where uncontrolled entry into the area or unescorted movement within the area could permit access to what is being protected.

(3) Level One (I). The least secure type of restricted area. Its appropriate application is to situations judged to warrant establishment of a restricted area, but less than a Level Three or Level Two restricted area.

c. Physical barriers control, deny, impede, delay and discourage access to restricted and non-restricted areas by unauthorized persons. They accomplish this by: defining the perimeter of restricted areas; establishing a physical and psychological deterrent to entry as well as providing notice that entry is not permitted; optimizing use of security forces; enhancing detection and apprehension opportunities by authorized personnel in restricted and non-restricted areas; and channeling the flow of personnel and vehicles through designated portals in a manner which permits efficient operation of the personnel identification and control system. The following guidance will be followed in the use of physical barriers and designation of restricted areas:

(1) An unobstructed area or clear zone, will be maintained on both sides of and between permanent physical barriers of restricted and non-restricted areas. Vegetation in such areas will not exceed eight inches in height.

(2) An inside clear zone will extend at least 30 feet from the perimeter barrier. Where possible, a larger clear zone should be provided to preclude or minimize damage from thrown objects such as incendiaries or bombs.

(3) The outside clear zone will be 70 feet or greater between the perimeter barrier and any exterior structures, vegetation or any obstruction to visibility. Construction of any new fence enclosing a restricted area having a smaller clear zone must be approved.

d. When protective lighting is installed and used, its primary objective is to provide adequate illumination or compensating measures to discourage or detect attempts to enter restricted areas and to reveal the presence of unauthorized persons within such areas. The following guidelines can be used

AUG 16 2011

in establishing protective lighting or inspecting lighting already in place:

(1) Light sources should be located so that the illumination is directed toward likely avenues of approach while providing relative darkness for patrol roads, paths and posts.

(2) Exterior building doors will be provided with lighting to enable the security force to observe and intruder seeking access.

(3) Airfields, aircraft, controlled industrial areas, petroleum storage areas and other mission critical areas will be provided with sufficient illumination for the security force to detect, observe and apprehend intruders.

(4) Restricted areas provided with protective lighting should have an emergency power source located within the restricted area. The secondary source shall be adequate to sustain security lighting, communications requirements and other essential services required within restricted areas.

e. COs have the responsibility to establish a security force to support their physical security programs. This force, the interior guard, are personnel organic to the activity who are specifically organized for the purpose of providing security for specific assets or areas controlled by the activity's CO. Members of the security force must be fully briefed on all aspects of their duties and thoroughly screened. Screening consists of:

(1) Service Record Book audit to determine Marine's suitability to standing an armed post or the possibility of being armed on duty.

(2) A complete Local Records Check (NAVMC 10482) submitted and passed by the PMO. (Persons conducting the local records check must have a signed letter on file at PMO stating that said individual has the permission by the CO to conduct local records checks.)

(3) Instruction on the use of deadly force.

(4) Chosen Marine must have qualified on the M16A2 within the last year. If Marine will be armed with the M9 service pistol or service shotgun, same rule applies.

Enclosure (1)

2. Flight Line Security

a. Recent national and international events have highlighted the importance of viable security measures to protect aircraft, hangars and assorted ground support equipment that are essential for the accomplishment of assigned missions. The flight line security program is designed to provide security for aircraft assigned to or transient on this installation and for facilities personnel considered necessary for maintaining squadron level operations on the flight line. The Provost Marshal is the installation Commander's primary Staff Officer for all flight line security matters. In addition, CO, MAG-14 also has specific responsibilities per reference (b). The most pertinent is listed below:

(1) Provide personnel to assist in the conduct of flight line security.

(2) Provide additional administrative controls and/or guards to enhance security measures in response to increased threats.

(3) Coordinate establishment of aircraft parking plans for approval by the installation Commander.

(4) Coordinate designation of MAG-14 restricted areas with the Provost Marshal.

(5) Coordinate flight line restricted area vehicle parking areas with the Provost Marshal.

(6) Submit to the Provost Marshal, on a monthly basis, a roster of personnel whose access to flight line restricted areas should be terminated.

b. The Flight Line Restricted Area (FLRA) will be identified by signs and barriers established along the perimeter. The barriers will be placed in a manner as to channel access to the FLRA through designated squadron Entry Control Points (ECPs). Groups/Squadrons will control access into that portion of the restricted area over which they have operational control.

c. The Flight Line Security Force (FLSF) will consist of Marines provided by 2d MAW under the Fleet Assistance Program (FAP). The Provost Marshal will be responsible for the

Enclosure (1)

WgO 3302.1A
AUG 10 2011

training, employment and supervision of the security force. See reference (j) for assignment criteria.

AUG 10 2011

INDIVIDUAL'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR ARMED
SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL REGARDING THE USE OF
FORCE

Name (Last, First, MI)	Rank	SSN	Date
------------------------	------	-----	------

1. Circumstances for which Deadly Force is Authorized:

I am justified in using the weapon with which I am armed to apply deadly force only under conditions of extreme necessity, when all other means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed and only as a last resort. If such is the case, I may use deadly force:

___ To protect myself or others, if I reasonably believe that I, or they, are in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.

___ To prevent acts which or the escape of those who reasonably appear to me to threaten property or information designated by my CO as vital to national security.

___ To prevent the actual theft or sabotage of property that is, of itself, dangerous to others (i.e. explosives, weapons, ammunition, etc.) when it appears reasonably necessary to do so.

___ To prevent or interrupt the commission of a serious offense involving violence which threatens death or serious bodily injury to another (i.e. murder, arson, armed robbery, aggravated assault and rape.)

___ To effect the apprehension or prevent the escape of an individual whom there is probably cause to believe has either committed or serious offense involving violence or threatened death or serious bodily harm and is a continued threat to the safety of others.

___ When it appears reasonably necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner provided I have probably cause to believe that the escaping prisoner poses a threat of serious bodily harm to security personnel or others.

2. Additional Specific Instructions:

___ I will obey the orders of competent authority to employ deadly force when:

Enclosure (1)

a. Provided with sufficient information to determine that the circumstances warrant the application of deadly force.

b. There is clear identifying information on the individual against whom deadly force is to be applied.

___ I will not fire my weapon if I might injure innocent bystanders, unless fired in protection of nuclear weapons.

___ I am prohibited from firing warning shots.

___ I will remove my pistol from my holster only when:

a. The use of deadly force is imminent or to effect the apprehension of a suspect I believe to be armed or dangerous or to gain control of a dangerous situation.

b. Firing at the range or accomplishing other required training.

c. Ordered to do so by competent authority.

d. Returning it to storage.

e. Cleaning it in authorized areas.

___ I will chamber a round in my pistol, rifle or shotgun only when:

a. The use of force is imminent or to effect the apprehension of a suspect I believe to be armed or dangerous or to gain control of a dangerous situation.

b. Firing at the range or accomplishing other required training.

c. Ordered to do so by competent authority.

___ I will not point any firearm at any person except:

a. To gain control of a situation.

b. When I intend to use deadly force.

c. During on-duty reaction drills only after I have checked the firearm and it has also been checked by my supervisor to ensure no rounds are in the weapon.

___ If I chamber a round in a rifle or shotgun or remove my pistol from its holster, proper notifications will be made and a Statement of Force form completed. I may chamber a round or point a firearm:

a. If directed by or after obtaining permission from competent authority.

b. If the situation/time does not permit obtaining permission, draw or point my weapon and then make notifications as soon as circumstances permit.

___ When clearing a firearm, I will follow current policies and procedures pertaining to firearms handling, clearing and safety, I will ensure that:

a. No weapon is cleared without a supervisor (Sergeant or above) present and clearing is accomplished only in the designated area (i.e. clearing barrel).

b. When drawing a weapon from the armory, rounds will not be drawn until the weapon is properly cleared.

c. When returning a weapon to the armory, rounds will always be properly accounted for and turned in prior to clearing the weapon, unless a round has been chambered.

d. Any violation of these policies or procedures is immediately reported to the proper authority.

___ I am prohibited from using a privately owned firearm or ammunition on duty.

___ During training exercises and testing, I will check my firearm and have it double-checked by a supervisor, to ensure that no live rounds are in the weapon and that there is no magazine inserted in the weapon.

___ I will comply with these principles when using less-lethal weapons or techniques such as handcuffs, baton, chemical spray, Military Working Dog, motor vehicles, etc., in such a manner that could cause death or serious bodily harm.

3. I have been instructed on the use of deadly force and acknowledge that I understand the basic rules for the use of force and weapons safety. I am aware of all areas aboard the installation that have been designated by the CO as vital to

Enclosure (1)

AUG 10 2011

national security for which the use of deadly force may be required.

Rank/Printed Name

Signature

Date

Enclosure (1)

Annex C: Operations

Appendix 6: Law Enforcement

1. The PMO on MCAS Cherry Point falls under the command of the Air Station CO. The Provost Marshal is responsible for fielding a military police force that provides law enforcement personnel. The military police mission requires its individual patrolmen/sentries to maintain the capability of employing his weapon expeditiously as situations dictate. Therefore, on-duty military police personnel will be posted with a loaded weapon. However, this does not preclude the Commander from posting an interior guard and issuing weapons if/when appropriate. If the Commander deems this necessary, coordination must be made with higher headquarters and the PMO.

2. Military Working Dogs (MWDs). To assist in maintaining security and discipline and to provide assistance in certain criminal investigations, MWDs may be used to detect narcotics and explosives. The dogs may be available, upon request, to tenant commands. The Explosives Detector Dog and handler may be available to civilian authorities when life threatening or severe property damage conditions exist. MWDs may be available to assist with:

a. Periodic command inspections of quarters, barracks and work areas.

b. Periodic contraband inspections of military and civilian vehicles entering, departing from or being operated aboard the Air Station. These inspections will be authorized by the CO as determined necessary and practical to provide for the security of the installation.

c. Dogs may be used to search military aircraft, freight, baggage and personnel arriving and departing from the Air Station.

d. Searches for narcotics and explosives pursuant to an authorization to search and in those situations where probable cause to search exists but circumstances require immediate action to prevent the removal of the drugs and/or explosives, the loss of life or serious property damage.

3. The operational control of MWDs and their handlers is vested in the Operations Division, Security Department. Requests for the dogs will be made to the Operations Division. Requesting

Enclosure (1)

WgO 3302.1A
AUG 10 2011

commands located outside MCAS Cherry Point will be responsible for all temporary additional duty funds involved and must provide adequate billeting where the dog and handler can be housed in the same building. For security reasons, all efforts should be made to have this area isolated from other troop billeting areas.

Enclosure (1)

Annex C: Operations

Appendix 7: Personnel Security

1. It is DoD policy that military installations, property and personnel be protected and that applicable laws and regulations be enforced. The authority of a DoD installation Commander to take reasonably necessary and lawful measures to maintain law and order and to protect installation personnel and property has long been recognized as follows:

a. That authority extends to temporarily established "National Defense Areas" under emergency situations such as accident sites involving federal equipment or personnel on official business.

b. That authority also includes the removal from, or the denial of access to, an installation or site of individuals who threaten the orderly administration of the installation or site.

c. Statutory authority also exists prohibiting individuals from reentering an installation after they have been removed and ordered not to reenter. If this Order is violated, the Commander of a DoD installation has authority to detain persons not subject to military law until the civil authorities can respond.

2. The COs of all naval ships, bases, stations, camps, activities or installations and the COs of all Marine Corps bases, camps, stations and supply activities, subject to the jurisdiction, administration or in the custody of the Department of the Navy shall issue the necessary regulations for the protection and security of property or places under their command.

3. The military Commanders shall prepare, conspicuously post and enforce the security orders and regulations issued, in accordance with reference (k) and cited public laws, to ensure the proper safeguarding of personnel, facilities and property from loss, destruction, espionage, terrorism or sabotage.

4. Civilians, who have been given authority to enter the installation, fall under the direct command of the installation Commander. The installation Commander can restrict civilian movement if in the interest of the installation to do so. This especially applies in mitigating the effects of a terrorist incident.

Enclosure (1)

AUG 10 2011

Annex C: Operations

Appendix 8: Operations Security (OPSEC)

1. Protection of critical information must become an integral part of daily operations and training. The ultimate purpose of OPSEC is to prevent an adversary or potential adversary from obtaining critical information that facilitates the prediction of friendly intentions, capabilities and activities. OPSEC is an operations function, not a security or intelligence function. However, OPSEC and these activities often overlap and are mutually supportive. Close coordination must be maintained between all staff functions to ensure adequate OPSEC protection. The following terms rate definition:

a. OPSEC Indicator. These are friendly detectable actions and open sources of information that adversary intelligence systems can potentially detect or obtain and then interpret to derive friendly critical information.

b. Critical Information. These are specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities and activities needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment.

2. The nature of the threat results from overlapping collection efforts targeted against all productive sources of information. Major threats are posed by hostile intelligence service agents, signal intelligence organizations, electronic warfare forces and reconnaissance means. These threats are present in combat as well as peacetime.

a. OPSEC in combat is principally concerned with identifying intelligence indicators that permit the enemy to predict the nature and timing of ongoing and projected friendly combat operations.

b. In a peacetime environment, OPSEC is principally oriented to the denial of a broad spectrum of information that collectively reveals U.S. current and future military capabilities, plans and operational procedures.

3. In accordance with reference (1), all 2d MAW units shall establish a formal OPSEC program. The AC/S G-3 is appointed as the 2d MAW OPSEC Program Manager and is responsible for the following:

Enclosure (1)

10 2011

- a. OPSEC policy, guidance and instructions.
 - b. Publishing an OPSEC planning guide that establishes minimum standards for conducting OPSEC activities.
 - c. Operating the office of record for OPSEC plans, program files and training materials.
 - d. Planning and programming technical and other OPSEC support for 2d MAW units, including the conduct of OPSEC vulnerability assessments of all 2d MAW activities.
4. The unit ATO should coordinate with the unit OPSEC manager for planning and training purposes.

Annex C: Operations

Appendix 9: EOC

1. The Commander, Marine Corps Installation East and the Chief of Staff will be immediately notified of a crisis, potential crisis, or similar special threat situation within his command (including MCAS New River and MCAS Beaufort). Any crisis that affects 2d MAW commands will be reported to the MCIEAST CG, since that person is the primary landholder of 2d MAW commands.
2. The CMT will be immediately formed when a crisis occurs or appears imminent. The coordinator for the CMT is the Air Station Director of Operations. The CMT will normally consist of the Officer of the Day, representatives from the SJA, Manpower Directorate, Operations Directorate, PMO, JPAO, Facilities Directorate, Supply Directorate and the Office of the Inspector. Augmentation will be directed as needed. When a crisis or serious incident occurs requiring a joint effort by 2d MAW and MCIEAST, a Joint Crisis Action Center will be formed.
3. Notification of a potential crisis or actual crisis will proceed as follows:
 - a. During Normal Work Hours
 - (1) Director of Operations.
 - (2) Chief of Staff.
 - (3) CG.
 - (4) Officer of the Day.
 - (5) Inspector.
 - b. After Normal Work Hours
 - (1) Officer of the Day.
 - (2) Director of Operations.
 - (3) Chief of Staff.
 - (4) CG.
 - (5) Inspector.

Enclosure (1)

AUG 10 2011

c. Once the CMT is formed, the CMT Coordinator will ensure all appropriate commands are notified and provided with the current status of the crisis or potential crisis.

Annex C: Operations

Appendix 10: Emergency Mass Notification

1. Instructions have been established, by the Air Station, for the emergency recall of military and civilian personnel from liberty or off-duty status with procedures to expeditiously pass information of an operational nature. Emergency recall or frost call, of Cherry Point personnel and notification of tenant Commanders will be accomplished by a series of telephone calls or by the use of motorized public address teams and local TV and radio station announcements. The Air Station uses channel 6. Also, there is a Destructive Weather/Force Protection Condition hotline, (252) 466-3093, that Marines can call twenty-four hours a day.

2. Upon direction of the CG 2d MAW, the Staff Secretary or Station CDO will activate the emergency recall system. The Station CDO will contact the Wing CDO, and it's the Wing Duty Officer's responsibility to contact subordinate commands. Execution orders, verbal or written, will specify: "THIS IS AN ACTUAL EMERGENCY, ACTIVATE YOUR EMERGENCY RECALL PLAN" or "THIS IS A FROST CALL." When directed, the Provost Marshal will dispatch public address teams to announce the recall in specified areas on and off the Air Station.

3. It is the responsibility of subordinate commands of 2d MAW to establish and maintain their emergency recall system. Emergency personnel will be designated for recall purposes; procedures will be established to pass frost call information and for the recall of assigned personnel during non-working hours; and emergency recall personnel lists will be maintained in the subordinate command duty binder.

4. Once a recall has been announced, all COs will submit a verbal and/or written report to the office originally notifying them of a recall. Reports will be submitted in 30-minute intervals from the time the recall is initiated until otherwise directed. Reports will contain the percentage of personnel on board and contacted.

5. The Wing CDO will also contact the Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron (MWHS-2) Adjutant to inform that person of the recall so that he/she can contact the MWHS-2 CO. The MWHS-2 Adjutant will be responsible for initiating their frost call or emergency recall system, including contacting the Wing Staff Sections.

Enclosure (1)

Annex D: Communications

1. Pre-Incident

a. Per the Order, the AC/S, G-6 (air station) has been tasked to provide certain services before and after an incident has taken place. These pre-incident tasks include:

(1) Provide communication services required to establish and operate the EOC.

(2) Serve as liaison with local telecommunications companies to direct/prioritize efforts in the even of an incident.

(3) Establish a base notification system used for transmission and dissemination of emergency and threat information.

(4) Develop a program to protect the information system infrastructure.

(5) When required, ensure the mobile PA systems are installed in appropriate vehicles designated by PMO.

b. Because incidents of a terrorist nature will come under the purview of air station command and control, it is necessary to reiterate air station policy. All key staff, area tenant commands and emergency organizations will use the telephone system as the primary means of communications. All communications assets will be monitored at all times. Information and reports required will be submitted via the telephone first, handheld radio second, email third, FAX fourth. If all else fails, courier is another available means of communicating.

c. The following emergency communications circuits will be established through the joint efforts of the MCI East AC/S G-6 and the 2d MAW AC/S G-6:

(1) MCAS Cherry Point Incident Command Net. This net is intended to provide emergency communications for the EOC and the support facilities of the air station. It will be activated when directed by the CG, Chief of Staff, other EOC representatives acting on the CG's behalf, during crisis management, utilizing existing UHF trunked handheld radio equipment.

Enclosure (1)

(2) MCI EAST Emergency Command Net. This circuit will provide voice communication between MCAS Cherry Point, MCAS Beaufort and MCAS New River in the event of telephone failure. It will be activated when crisis response requires. This net will be operated using appropriate high frequency radio equipment installed in the EOC communications room.

(a) Call signs and frequencies

STATION	CALL SIGN	FREQUENCY
MCAS Cherry Point	Cherry Point	Primary: 4014.0
MCAS New River	New River	Secondary: 6481.0
MCAS Beaufort	Beaufort	Spares: 8638.0 12948.0

(3) Citizens Band (CB) Emergency Net. This net will be activated and monitored during crisis response and the EOC will monitor Channel 11. Operators of CB radio equipment may inform the EOC of injuries and emergencies.

(4) 2d MAW Emergency Command Net. This UHF trunked radio net will provide emergency communications between the EOC and the Group headquarters located at MCAS Cherry Point. This net will be activated during crisis response.

(5) Portable Satellite Terminal. CG MCI East may request a satellite communications terminal to provide communications between Cherry Point, MCB Camp Lejeune, MCAS New River and COMMARFORLANT. Equipment and personnel to support this circuit will be requested from II MEF.

Annex E: Service Support

1. One assumption is that some service support requirements will increase beyond MCAS Cherry Point's capability following a terrorist act, criminal act or natural disaster. Accordingly, the Director of Facilities and Supply Officer will be the principle points of contact for all purchases of supplies in support of AT and force protection operations. The Supply Officer is designated as the coordinator for the acquisition and/or temporary loan of supplies and equipment in support of all emergency or crisis situations. As such, he/she will direct all temporary loans of equipment and/or material from subordinate commands to required users.

2. Incident Phase

a. Director of Facilities. During this phase, and prior to the establishment of the CMT, service support will be provided on a routine basis. Upon the establishment of the CMT, all service and supply support requests will be forwarded through the Director of Facilities representative to the EOC for action via the Rapid Request format. The Director of Facilities will determine if support of this crisis will warrant the establishment of a Logistics Operations Center (LOC) to monitor the crisis and provide logistical support via the Facilities representative to the CMT.

b. Supply Support

(1) Class I (Rations). MCAS Cherry Point Dining Facility will be used to support the crisis situation. When possible "A" rations will be supplied to all customers. Twenty-four hour feeding operations will be implemented if necessary. Adequate quantities of Meals Ready to Eat (MREs), a two-day supply for approximately 1500 people, are available in the event of a serious incident. Adequate resources are available through multiple sources to regenerate food supply once the initial supplies are depleted. All requests for Class I rations will be submitted to the Supply Officer via the Rapid Request format at the EOC.

(2) Class II (Clothing, Individual Equipment and Tentage). All area commanders are responsible for providing protective masks to their personnel to include civilians. Shortages in protective masks will be reported to the CMT via the Supply Officer. The Supply Officer will coordinate redistribution and/or procurement of protective masks.

Enclosure (1)

Individual clothing will be coordinated with AAFES and the Retail Clothing Office for military uniforms. Requests will be submitted to the Supply Officer via Rapid Request to the EOC.

(3) Class III (POL). All vehicles will be dispatched with a full tank of fuel. Vehicles can use credit cards off base or refuel at normal refueling points as required. If the situation dictates, 24-hour refueling operations will be implemented.

(4) Class IV (Construction and Fortification Material). All requests for materials, engineer or heavy equipment support along with movement requests will be requested to the Facilities Maintenance Department via Rapid Request.

(5) Class V (Ammunition). All requests for ammunition will be requested to the Supply Officer via Rapid Request to the EOC. The Supply Officer will coordinate all issue, receipt and movement of munitions as required. It is advisable that subordinate commands calculate ahead of time the amount of ammunition needed to supply their interior guard.

(6) Class VI (Personal Demand Items). Not Applicable.

(7) Class VII (Major End Items). All requests for major end items (water bulls, generators, forklifts, etc.) will be requested to the Supply Officer via Rapid Request. The Supply Officer will coordinate all issue, receipt and movement of all major end items as required.

(8) Class VIII (Medical). The Supply Officer will coordinate with appropriate medical personnel to plan and supervise mortuary affairs if necessary. When beyond the capability of the Halyburton Naval Health Clinic, a temporary mortuary facility will be established at the Marine Dome. Refrigerated tractor-trailers will be contracted to serve both as an overflow mortuary and for transportation of human remains from the incident site.

(9) Class IX (Repair Parts). All routine maintenance will be conducted in accordance with prescribed SOP. The maintenance facility may conduct 24-hour operations should the situation dictate. The Director of Facilities and the Supply Officer will be available for general and/or direct support for all maintenance concerns.

Enclosure (1)

3. Post Incident Phase. On order from the CMT/EOC, the Logistics Coordinator will begin the orderly recovery and return of all equipment and supplies temporarily loaned and/or purchased in support of an incident. All costs associated with repair or replacement of loaned assets will be reported within ten working days, by the owning unit, to the Director of Facilities for consolidation and submission to the Comptroller. Funding codes for antiterrorism or force protection crisis management expenditures, established by the station Comptroller, will be utilized to afford line item and fiscal accountability.

Annex F: Civil-Military Operations

1. Pre-Incident

a. The PMO is responsible for drafting and maintaining all Memorandums of Agreement/Memorandums of Understanding (MOA/MOU) with civil agencies immediately outside the installation. The air station ATO is thoroughly familiar with these documents. 2d MAW does not have direct liaison authority.

b. Certain criminal acts come under the jurisdiction of the Provost Marshal or Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), but when these acts are committed by terrorists or suspected terrorists, they come under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice (DoJ). The FBI is the DoJ's operational agency for the management of terrorist incidents within the U.S. A terrorist incident may be divided into three phases:

(1) Phase I: This phase involves immediate response to a terrorist situation. When an incident occurs, the CG, MCAS Cherry Point, will use military police and Special React Teams (SRT) to provide initial response. The CG may take such immediate action in response to an incident as may be necessary to protect life and property during the initial phases before the FBI response teams arrive on the scene.

(2) Phase II: This phase manages resources required to counter a prolonged terrorist situation. The FBI has primary jurisdiction for domestic terrorism and either accepts or declines jurisdiction based on federal interests. The military supports the FBI under current DoD and DoJ Memorandums of Understanding. However, military personnel will remain under military authority.

(3) Phase III: Phase III continues to manage resources required to counter a prolonged terrorist situation. The National Command Authority (NCA) intercedes if the FBI or installation cannot resolve the incident. The NCA provides specially trained civilian and military forces to resolve the incident. If the NCA commits military forces, the Secretary of Defense directs military operations according to law enforcement policies determined by the U.S. Attorney General.

Enclosure (1)

Annex G: Training and Exercises

1. Training: There are currently four levels of training required for military personnel, depending on rank and/or billet. The following table lists the level of training, what personnel are required to participate in that training and the training standards mastered upon completion of that level training.

Level of Training	Target Audience	Minimum Training Standard
<p>Level I AT Awareness Training provided annually to:</p> <p>(1) All OCONUS-based DoD Personnel</p> <p>(2) All active uniformed CONUS-based members of the CINs and Services</p> <p>(3) All CONUS-based DoD personnel eligible for official OCONUS travel on Government orders</p> <p>(4) All CONUS-based DoD personnel regardless of duty status if the CONUS Terrorism Threat Level is promulgated above "MODERATE"</p> <p>(5) Graduates will have requisite knowledge to remain vigilant for possible terrorist actions and employ AT tactics, techniques, and procedures, as discussed in DoD O-2000.12-H (reference (c)) and Joint Pub 3-07.2 (reference (i)).</p>	<p>(1) DoD personnel accessions during initial training.</p> <p>(2) Military, DoD, civilians, their family members 14 years old and greater (when family members are deploying or traveling on Government orders), and DoD-employed Contractors.</p>	<p>Component-provided instruction; Incorporates Component-standardized POI consisting of the following minimum topics:</p> <p>1. Viewing the Service-selected personal awareness video provided under the instruction and/or DoD-sponsored, and Component-certified, computer-based and/or distance learning (DoD personnel accessions must receive initial training under instruction of a qualified Level I AT Awareness Instructor)</p> <p>2. Instruction on the following:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">a. Introduction to Terrorism</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">b. Terrorist Operations</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">c. Individual Protective Measures</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">d. Terrorist Surveillance Techniques</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Attacks •Kidnapping & Hostage Survival •Explanation of Terrorism Threat Levels and Force Protection Condition System <p>3. Issuance of "Antiterrorism Individual Protective Measures" folding card. (Local reproduction of both is authorized.)</p> <p>4. Receipt of AOR updates three months prior to travel to include current threat brief and AOR-specific requirements as provided by the receiving geographic CINC.</p>

<p>Level II AT OFFICER (ATO) Training</p> <p>Level II ATO training is designed to produce an AT advisor to the Commander. Commanders will ensure that each installation and/or deploying unit is assigned at least one Level II ATO trained individual.</p> <p>**Graduates shall have requisite knowledge and materials to manage a comprehensive AT Program and advise the commander in all AT areas.</p>	<p>Officers/NCOs/civilian staff officers, who are tracked and command-designated to serve as the AT advisor to the Commander and provide Level I Instruction in coded billets.</p>	<p>Component-provided instruction (resident or MTT); incorporates Component-standardized POI consisting of the following minimum topics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Understanding AT Roles and Responsibilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Understand Policy & Standards -Access Reference Sources •Organize for AT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Command/Staff Relationships -FP Working Groups •Assess Vulnerabilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Baseline Unit FP Posture -Conduct Assessment •Assess Threat <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Intel/CI Integration -Information OPS •Create and Execute AT Programs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Use of Terrorism Threat Level/Force Protection Conditions -Unit/Installation Protective Measures -Mitigating Vulnerabilities •Prepare AT Plans <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Templates & Planning Tools -How to develop & write Plans -WMD Considerations -Use of RAM to protect the Installation •AT Resource Management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Requirements Generation & Prioritization -CbT RIF •Conduct AT Training <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Exercise Unit AT Plans -Obtain AOR-specific updates -Oversee AT Level I Training <p>2. Review of DoD Directive 2000.12, Instruction 2000.16, DoD O-2000.12H, and other applicable DoD/Service/Agency publications.</p> <p>3. Methods available for obtaining AOR-specific updates for deployment/travel areas.</p> <p>4. Component-directed modules on other aspects of AT such as physical security requirements, technology updates, etc.</p>
---	--	---

Level of Training	Target Audience	Minimum Training Standard
<p>Level III Pre-Command AT Training Designed to expose the prospective commander to AT issues.</p> <p>**Graduates shall have requisite knowledge and materials to supervise a comprehensive AT Program and Manage AT issues.</p>	<p>O-5/O-6 Commanders</p>	<p>Component-provided instruction during pre-commander pipelines; incorporates Component-standardization POI consisting of the following minimum topics:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.Viewing the SECDEF/CJCS Video 2.Directive/reference review <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Understanding AT Responsibilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Understanding Policy -Assessments -Off-Installation Housing •Ensuring Preparation of AT Plans <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Baseline FP posture -Mitigating WMD Attack -MOUs/MOAs •Ensuring Conduct of AT Planning <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -AT Plans & Training -Level I Training •Organizing for AT •Understanding for the Local Threat Picture <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Fusion of Intelligence •Building a Sustainable AT Program <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Terrorism Threat Levels •Executing Resource Responsibilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -AT Resource Programming -Construction Standards •Understanding Use of Force and ROE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Terrorist Scenarios & Hostile Intent Decision Making <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3.Review of DoD Directive 2000.12, DoD Instruction 2000.16, DoD)-2000.12-H, and other applicable DoD/Service/Agency publications. 4.Issuance of Commander's Handbook (Joint Pub 5260).

Level of Training	Target Audience	Minimum Training Standard
<p>Level IV AT Executive Seminar The Level IV AT Executive Seminar is designed to expose senior officers in the grades of O6-O8.</p> <p>**Graduates shall have requisite knowledge and materials to provide oversight to AT Programs and Policies.</p>	<p>Officers in the grade of O6-O8 and D3 Department of Defense civilians in equivalent grades selected for at programs or involved in AT policy, planning and execution.</p>	<p>CJCS Executive-level seminar hosted by J-34. Provides pertinent current updates, briefings, and panel discussion topics. Seminar includes 3 tabletop AT war games aimed at facilitating interaction and discussion among seminar participants.</p>

2. All 2d MAW commands will ensure that every military service member and/or DoD employee within their command, is made aware of the need to maintain vigilance for possible terrorist actions. All CONUS based personnel will receive Level I training annually, as will all OCONUS based service members.

a. Family members: every family member accompanying DoD personnel overseas will be made aware of the need to maintain vigilance for possible terrorist actions. Family members 14 years and older traveling beyond CONUS shall receive Level I AT Awareness training as part of their pre-departure requirements. The same applies when service members and their families travel OCONUS on leave or personal business.

b. Individuals may become qualified to administer Level I AT Awareness Training by attending a Level II ATO training course of instruction. The command ATO is therefore qualified to administer Level I briefs to members of the command.

c. Level I AT Awareness Training can also be completed online at: [HTTP://AT-AWARENESS.ORG](http://AT-AWARENESS.ORG).

3. Exercises: Commanders shall conduct field and staff training to exercise AT plans, to include AT physical security measures, terrorist incident response measures and terrorist consequence management procedures, at least annually. AT training and exercises shall be provided the same emphasis afforded combat task training and executed with the intent to identify shortfalls impacting the protection of personnel and assets against terrorist assault and subsequent consequence management efforts. AT training will also be incorporated into unit-level training plans and pre-deployment exercises. Commanders should maintain exercise documentation for no less than one year.

a. Commanders at all levels will review their own AT program and plans at least annually to facilitate AT program enhancement. Furthermore, for the same purpose, commanders at all levels shall likewise review the AT program and plan of their immediate subordinate in the chain of command at least annually.

b. Per the air station order, station will conduct a physical security and antiterrorism exercise annually. A mass casualty exercise will be conducted bi-annually. A HAZMAT response exercise will be conducted annually. 2d MAW command element and units will support these exercises as required. In

addition, commanders of tenant activities are to identify their own training requirements to the Operations Division when notified of the planned exercise. Commanders can schedule their own internal exercises at their discretion and are encouraged to do so.

Annex H: Public Affairs

1. 2d MAW has no internal public affairs capability, so all public affairs matters fall under the purview of the Air Station PAO.

a. The PAO will support the station and tenant activities in the timely and accurate release and management of information to the public, the news media and personnel aboard the Air Station.

b. Tenant commands are instructed, in reference (h), to appoint a Unit Information Officer program to provide a flow of information and to liaison with the PAO.

2. In the event of situations that draw mass media attention in response to a potential or realized threat, the PAO will stand up a Command Information Bureau (CIB) to handle media and other PAO. It may become necessary to transfer command of the CIB to the senior agency to respond to the incident. After transfer, the CIB becomes the Joint Information Bureau.